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Calculating profit: a historical perspective on the development of capitalism 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper introduces the notion of different methods of calculating and analysing 
profitability as signatures of capitalism at different stages of development. Interactions 
between the development of the productive forces and the socialisation of capital 
ownership jointly impact on these signatures, such that profit calculations are historically 
contingent. These interactions take the identification of capitalism beyond simple 
associations with the presence or absence of double-entry bookkeeping (DEB), the capital 
account or return on capital calculations. Profit calculations are implicated in the process 
of transition from feudalism to capitalism by enabling the private enforcement of profit 
levels in excess of legally regulated interest rates or through fairly remunerated labour. 
The modern usage of ROCE is linked to the development of the productive forces and the 
socialisation of capital ownership. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The ‘Sombart thesis’ that it is impossible to envisage accounting without capitalism and 
impossible to envisage capitalism without accounting (Sombart, 1916), has been usefully 
extended first by Weber and more recently by Bryer (2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2006a). Weber 
(1927) suggested that the specific signature of capitalism was not merely DEB, as 
suggested by Sombart, but the existence of the capital account which supports rational 
computation of income yield through modern bookkeeping. Bryer develops the point, 
arguing broadly that what is important is the capitalist mentality, evidenced by the type of 
calculations that accounts are used for and manifested as accounting signatures. More 
narrowly, Bryer (2005, p.25) identifies capitalism with the calculation of rates of return 
and more specifically still, the return on capital employed (ROCE).  
It is evident however, that if ROCE is an accounting signature, there are a number 
of definitional permutations, for example with reference to opening closing or average 
values in the denominator, deduction of depreciation in the numerator, denominator, or 
both, definition of items to be included in the numerator or denominator etc. Rather than 
attempt a definition of ROCE consistent with a specific mentality, in this paper it is 
argued that the method of calculation reflects the organisation of the forces of production 
and the socialisation of capital and the process of their interaction. The accounting 
signature thereby follows, and is manifested in corresponding and contingent analytical 
computations of profit and profitability. The Sombart-Weber thesis is extended by 
suggesting that the feudal superstructure, particularly the Church’s antipathy to usury, 
imposed significant limits on the computation of profit, the method of computing the rate 
of return and the openness of its disclosure. ROCE itself is a product of fully developed 
capitalism.  
To develop these propositions, the remainder of the paper is set out as follows. 
Section two examines the Sombart-Weber thesis and develops the notion of the private 
enforcement of profit levels in excess of legally regulated interest rates. Section three 
reviews the evidence on utilisation of return on capital calculations and similar or 
alternative measures since the industrial revolution. Section four summarises and draws 
conclusions. 
 
II 
Capitalism is defined as a system of private enforcement of profit rates in excess of 
amounts obtainable through legally regulated interest rates or through fairly remunerated 
labour. Transitional capitalism is evidenced by private enforcement of profit rates in 
excess of that obtainable through legally regulated interest rates or through fairly 
remunerated labour. Fully developed capitalism is characterised by generalised private 
enforcement of profit at any rate without reference to legal interest rates or fair 
remuneration to labour effort.1 Capitalism is about the private appropriation of profit, 
which is enforceable through contract and other institutions of law and governance. 
Because contracts are often incomplete, private enforceability is partial and therefore 
risky. The association between capitalism and excess profit also implies that there must 
be a measurement process, achieved by accounting techniques, such that profit can be 
ascertained. Under feudalism, the required institutions of law that presuppose a legal and 
measurable surplus did not exist. Transitional capitalism and associated accounting 
measurement is thereby implicitly defined by the removal of intolerance to usury which 
characterised feudalism. 
Restrictions on usury descended from tribal custom and later ecclesiastical law, 
which opposed lending within the common group, and tended to permit it only when 
loans were made to groups outside the jurisdiction (Weber, 1927, p.267-8). Weber’s 
argument can be extended to conceptualise the social nature of risk. In this case, an 
important feature of intra-group transactions was elimination of risk through its 
socialisation, providing a material basis for feudal opposition to usury. Specification of 
the social nature of risk in feudal societies is important at this stage of the argument in 
order to offer contrasts with subsequent alternatives. 
External trading activities created exceptions to the social elimination of risk. ‘Sea 
Loans’ made between Italian merchants reflected differential levels of risk in voyages of 
                                                 
1 Transitional and fully developed capitalism are specific categories for the purpose of 
these definitions, both of which correspond to a generic definition of capitalism, as a 
mode of production characterised by the private ownership of the means of production by 
a class to the exclusion of the majority of the population (Desai, 1991, p.71). 
 
differing length and perceived hazard, but these and all other usurious loans were 
opposed by the medieval church, most vigorously by Pope Gregory IX (1224-1243). 
Latent conflict between the Church and mercantile classes ultimately erupted into the 
Protestant reformation and the progressive dismantling of restrictions on lending, in 
which Calvinists recognised the desirability of lending within the rich elite who carried 
on business using borrowed money (Weber, 1927, pp.267-71). From this recognition 
follows Weber’s characterisation of capitalism as dependent on a calculable law and 
accounting’s ability to determine capital’s income yielding power (Weber, 1927, p.275). 
For Weber, this is achieved by striking the balance, a device first suggested by Simon 
Stevin in 1698. However this process does not explain how capitalists carried out their 
calculations, be it in terms of calculative mentality (Bryer, 2000a, 2005) or, as suggested 
here, that as capitalism develops a number of possibilities for computing income yielding 
power arise. These might include residual income, dividend yield, return on partner’s 
capital, return on equity, ROCE etc. All of these methods were made difficult or 
impossible by restrictions on lending at interest under the usury laws.2
Restrictions on usury therefore have serious implications for the development of 
capitalism and accounting, and moreover, represent the social enforcement of the labour 
theory of value. Capitalism does not abolish the theory, but through developing its own 
institutions, overcomes restrictions on its practical enforcement. As noted above 
opposition to usury was entrenched in the settled rural communities of feudal Britain and 
                                                 
2 In England, the outright restriction on such activities ended with the Act of 1571, which 
introduced a legal maximum interest rate of 10%. A subsequent Act of 1623, amended 
this to 5% and there were further adjustments throughout the seventeenth (Grassby, 1969) 
and eighteenth (Pressnell, 1960) centuries.  
 
legislative Acts marked gradual staging posts in its protracted demise.3 So much so that 
even architects of the Protestant reformation such as Luther argued that merchants’ 
profits were indeed nothing more than the fruits of their labour (Tawney, 1960, pp.35-6). 
Aquinas and other Catholic scholars equated merchants’ money to their tools of labour so 
that lending to others reduced their capacity to work and therefore entitled them to 
compensation for enforced idleness (Noonan, 1957, p.127; Ashley, 1931, p.392). Such 
physiocratic sentiments became even more embedded in orthodox political economy until 
the mid-nineteenth century (Tawney, 1960, pp.35-6).4 Application of labour theory of 
value to merchant’s profits so that they appear as wages and the general social 
unacceptability of excess returns, suggest that it would be extremely unlikely that 
businessmen would use accounts to compute the ex post5 ROCE. As England’s economic 
base expanded from the 15th century, lucrum cessans became the sine qua non of 
partnership accounting, so that as Ashley explains (1931, pp.399-401, 404, 412-416), the 
‘sleeping partner’ Italian commenda system was supplanted, and partners only shared 
profits if they shared the risk.  
                                                 
3  The 1571 Act explicitly allowed interest to be charged (at a maximum rate of 10%), 
and subsequent Acts for example in 1624 and 1651 modified the rate downwards. The 
1571 Act remained in force until 1854 (Kerridge, 2002, p.74). 
 
4  Tawney (1960, p.36) notes the first of these schoolmen was Thomas Aquinas and the 
last was Karl Marx. 
 
5  Equalisation of risk through the Sea Loans system, associated development of insurance 
contracts, and the doctrine of lucrum cessans (loss of profit through merchants’ labour), 
led to the revision of scholastic doctrine by Cardinal Cajetan in the early sixteenth 
century, such that differences in expected risk justified ex ante lending decisions at 
differential interest rates (Noonan, 1957, pp.252-255). The parallel doctrine of turpe 
lucrum, or ill-gotten gains, which specified the remedy for monopoly profit at the 
expense of unknown persons, as the requirement to give alms to the poor [as opposed to 
restitution under usury] (De Roover, 1951, p.498) would have reinforced this attitude. 
 
In accounting terms, the socialisation of capital6 as it progresses implies new rules 
about circulation and distribution of profit and processes of accountability through the 
development of DEB as ownership is widened and credit relations multiply. Socialisation 
also implies profit sharing within legally established rules and social norms which 
changed as a function of the latent conflict between medieval laws on usury, discussed 
above, and the steady accumulation of mercantile profit. In the 1570s there is no evidence 
that woollen merchant John Isham calculated return on capital or that this could have 
been done accurately (Ramsay, 1962, p.lxxxiii). Throughout the period 1494-1840, 
balances were struck irregularly and the capital account provided no basis for rational 
calculation (Pollard, 1963, p.78). Merchants’ ledgers of the seventeenth century did not 
give them the means to compute the return on capital, but their accounts did record 
transactions (Grassby, 1969), giving them the financial control and accountability they 
needed. Indeed capital socialisation provides a convincing explanation of the adoption of 
DEB in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and risk related profit sharing schemes 
(Bryer, 2000b, pp. 336-7).    
However, capital socialisation gives only a partial explanation of accounting for 
profit. If the analysis of the forces of production is added, a framework to explain the 
variety and transition of rate of return calculations can be developed as a dialectic of the 
centralisation of the forces of production and the socialisation of the ownership of 
                                                 
6 Socialisation refers to the pooling of money reserves, whether through banks or capital 
markets (Campbell, 1998, p.134), which as a process applied to ownership begins with 
partnerships, extends through capital markets to promote the mobility of capital (Marx, 
1984, p.196, Bryer, 2005, p.29), to its fullest expression as pooled capital on a globalised 
basis (Henwood, 1998, p.241, Desai, 2002, Toms, 2005), as restrictions on the transfer of 
capital are broken down. In similar and parallel fashion, capitalist property relations 
emerge and develop from the internal contradictions of existing property relations (Dobb, 
1946).  
 
production (Toms, 2005). In early industrial forms, such as the putting out system and in 
early textile factories, capital is owned by sub-contractors and employees and labour is 
only formally subsumed, so global ROCE calculations are rendered difficult and 
relatively useless by capital decentralisation, whilst the importance of bookkeeping is 
reinforced by attenuated social relations, moral hazard and contract enforcement 
requirements. Samuel Oldknow relied on a detailed double entry system debiting each 
weaver’s account with specification, quantity and price of yarn given out and credited 
with the quantity of cloth returned and wages paid. Oldknow and others received support 
from the development of small debtors’ courts and anti-embezzlement legislation (Unwin 
et al, pp34-37, 48-50).  
As centralisation occurs through vertical integration, businesses become more 
internally complex and accounting mechanisms are required to trace costs expended in 
production and levels of efficiency. Charging capital costs to departments becomes useful 
in this respect, but the use of segmental ROCE remains problematic due to the presence 
of shared assets. On the other hand, as capital centralises through horizontal integration, 
ROCE becomes more useful as it provides managers7 with a homogenous standard for 
diverse businesses and allows them to manage without detailed understanding of the 
separate complexities of individual branches. The modern origin of ROCE has been 
linked to the emergence of such organisations (Johnson, 1984). Because they are relative 
latecomers, their accounting methods are more a product of the second rather than the 
first industrial revolution.  
                                                 
7 ‘Managers’ as opposed to ‘agents’ are associated with the development of diversified 
businesses from the mid nineteenth century onwards and consistent with the etymology 
of ‘Management’ as a collective noun (Williams, 1976). 
 
Meanwhile as capital socialised in joint stock companies corresponding 
mechanisms for equitable distribution of profit emerged. Such arrangements lead to 
specific analytical performance measures such as dividend yield and price/earnings 
ratios, as opposed to Bryer’s ROCE. Even so, these do not appear simultaneously, but 
reflect the state of development of capital markets (Rutterford, 2004). If price/earnings 
for example is related to the degree of socialisation, then its use would be rare under 
conditions of thin capital markets, individual share ownership and full dividend 
distribution, and more common where there is capital accumulation by corporations 
whose shares are traded in deep markets, for example where channelled by investment 
institutions. However, neither centralisation nor socialisation proceeds in historical 
straight lines. The forces interact, so that changes in the forces of production can reorder 
socialisation, or vice versa,8 setting accounting calculations in the context of a historical 
dialectic.  
Evidence from a systematic review would allow two propositions (P1 and P2) to 
be examined. The first, P1, and following the discussion on usury above, notwithstanding 
their increasing ability to develop the productive forces, is that businessmen might be 
expected to be coy about profitability, either in terms of its calculation and disclosure, 
until the legislative remnants of feudalism were dismantled. The second (P2), by contrast 
following Bryer (2005, p.35) accounting signatures of capitalism and might be expected 
to correspond to ‘capitalist’ ROCE calculations which correspond to the real subsumption 
                                                 
8 For examples of capital market imposed ‘downsizing’ in the 1980s, see Jensen (1993) 
Toms and Wright (2002). 
 
of labour and include depreciation adjustments. Each of the empirical propositions is 
examined against the evidence, in approximate chronology.  
III 
The objective of this section is to examine the propositions and to build on the work of 
Bryer and others who have conducted detailed and disparate enquiries into rate of profit 
calculations. Specific attention is given first to the transition from feudalism to capitalism, 
and Bryer’s theoretical and empirical account of this insofar as it affects the computation 
of the rate of profit. The empirical evidence for later capitalist ROCE calculations is then 
reviewed.  
For Bryer, capitalist ROCE appears where depreciation is deducted from the 
numerator and denominator, and where no allowance is made for depreciation, the 
calculation is the ‘feudal’ rate of return, for example at New Mills in 1681 (Bryer, 2000a, 
p.146). Bryer distinguishes between two rates of return that correspond to prevailing 
mentalities in different epochs of economic history (Bryer, 2000a, p.146):  
From Marx's perspective, by contrast, only if DEB calculates the feudal rate of return on 
capital is there evidence of the capitalistic mentality, and use of DEB is only evidence of 
the capitalist mentality if it produces the return on capital employed in production. 
 
Although this one possible interpretation of Marx, it seems an unlikely one since Marx, 
unlike Weber, gave no recognition to the calculable aspect of technology, or to the causal 
importance of calculable law (Collins, 1980, p.938). Nonetheless, in the context of 
accounting history it does suggest one possible relation between the calculative mentality 
and accounting signature.  
According to P2, (Bryer, 2005), joint-stock trading companies were the first to 
pursue the rate of return on capital using DEB. These were ‘semi-capitalist’ because they 
calculated the ‘feudal rate of return’ by taking ‘feudal surplus’ and dividing it by initial 
capital advanced. However, as Baladouni points out (1986, p.28) in the case of the East 
India Company, and as the evidence from Grassby (1969) suggests, there was no 
consistent conceptual framework underlying these calculations.9 Whilst there is certainly 
evidence that some merchants in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, of the East India 
Company [EIC] (Chaudhuri, 1965), and others (Grassby, 1969, p.749) did calculate rates 
of return, and in the case of the EIC calculations responded to the socialisation of capital 
(Bryer, 2000b, p.365), they did so in a context of colonisation and licensed privateering 
and associated profit sharing calculations (Andrews, 1964, p.16). As discussed earlier, in 
the feudal period excess profits were acceptable where earned at the expense of 
foreigners, which in the case of usurious gains from the Indian trade were dealt with 
secretively (Grassby, 1995, p.238). Grassby provides exhaustive evidence of rate of 
return calculations (1995, pp. 234-36), but stresses contemporary calculations were 
usually gross profits on particular transactions, in most cases assisting the merchant with 
the pricing decision, and that ‘merchants rarely calculated their net return on capital.’ 
(1995, p. 236).  
Whilst mark-up calculations were useful to merchants for pricing, commission 
and customs calculations, the purpose of the ‘feudal rate of return’ seems less obvious. 
For Bryer (2000b, p.328), ‘Marx’s theory predicts that feudal merchants only became 
capitalistic, signatured by their use of DEB to calculate the feudal rate of return on capital, 
when they socialised their capital’ (emphasis added). As Bryer (1994, p.317) suggests 
correctly, from Marx’s perspective feudal surplus was based on labour coercion. Bryer 
                                                 
9 The political economist Thomas Munne suggested an investors’ target ratio of value 
returned to value invested of 3.5 to 1, which would seem to approximate to the notion of 
a rate of return (Chaudhuri, 1965, p.67). At the Dutch East India Company ‘the strict 
notion of profit was never grasped…’ (Levy, 1950, vol. 1, p.19). 
 
(2005, 2006a, p.370) then argues that where farmers use feudal surplus semi-
capitalistically ‘they accounted for feudal surplus as the increment to initial capital, that is, 
for the feudal rate-of-return’. 10  Leaving aside the apparent confusion between a 
difference and a ratio, the example cited, Grange Farm, which comes from Monteague in 
1675 shows that wages were paid. It is difficult to see how Besse Hobbes11 could have 
her labour coerced and be paid wages at the same time, unless the numerator in Bryer’s 
feudal rate of return is something other than ‘feudal surplus’. Meanwhile there is no 
evidence of the ‘initial capital’ being used as a denominator in any such calculation, nor 
does the cited example show how profit is incremented to the initial capital and carried 
forward. What actually happens is that profit of £136 is computed as cash received minus 
cash paid minus the loss of value of the lease during the accounting period. It is not clear 
how any of the numbers in the calculation relate to feudal surplus or the feudal rate of 
return except that in another example of 1618, Bryer (2000b, p.375) says the rate of 
return on the opening capital would be £85/£1455 = 5.8% (and) …Nicholas Toke could 
have calculated the feudal rate of return on capital’ (emphasis added). There is no 
evidence that Toke did any such calculation. Moreover, Toke was accountable only to 
himself and his father (Bryer, 2000b, p.374), and this hardly constitutes socialised capital. 
Similarly according to Bryer, (2000b, p.342), ‘These merchants (as discussed by Grassby, 
1969) could have calculated the feudal rate of return on capital’ (emphasis added). 
                                                 
10 The feudal rate of return is Bryer’s term and defined (2005, p.29-30) as the feudal 
surplus divided by the initial capital advanced. As a matter of semantics, in this case the 
‘increment to initial capital’ is not the same as a rate of return as a ratio. As demonstrated 
below, there is further confusion as to Bryer’s use of the term feudal surplus.  
 
11 Besse Hobbes is the sole employee on Monteague’s hypothetical Grange Farm. 
 
 Table 1 about here 
As this review suggests, there is some imprecision as to the use of the term return on 
capital and an associated doubt about the interpretation of empirical evidence. Therefore 
a further detailed review of the use of the term in prior studies is warranted. Bryer (2005) 
survey is a useful starting point for such a review, since it provides a reasonably 
comprehensive summary. Table 1 provides an analysis of the examples directly cited by 
Bryer (2005) and elsewhere (2000b, 2006c) of uses of the ROCE measure (Panel A). 
Selected calculations used by others not cited by Bryer are shown in Panel B. The table 
shows the name of the entrepreneur or business, the date at which the ROCE calculation 
was observed and the industry in which the firm was involved. The next column provides 
a summary of the method used and in Panel A where there is a claim of ROCE from 
Bryer, the method described in the original source cited by Bryer is also outlined in italic 
underneath as a commentary. 
 The earliest example cited by Bryer is Robert Loder who developed ‘a single 
entry system for calculating the return on capital’ (Bryer, 2000b, p.376) and who in 1611, 
was performing residual income calculations (Bryer, 2005, p.39). For Bryer, Loder is a 
transitional character, half feudal, half capitalist. Loder apparently ‘capitalised interest as 
a cost of production’ which ‘is evidence of a feudal mentality’ (Bryer, 2000b, p.373). 
However, this is not obviously feudal. In modern accounting it can be quite legitimate to 
add interest charges to the capitalised cost of fixed assets, for example FAS34 And 
IAS23 both consider the circumstances in which such capitalisation is appropriate 
(Deloitte, 2006). Loder also charged 10% on the capital tied up in his crops as a 
deduction from his surplus and according to Bryer (2000b, p.373), ‘charging notional 
interest on total capital employed to divide the surplus between the required rate of return 
on capital and the residual income is evidence of the modern capitalist mentality’ (see 
also, Bryer, 1994, p.225). As suggested by P1, such calculations reflected the productive 
forces employed and the process of social accountability. So the charge was partial, 
applied only to that proportion of capital tied up in crops and not the other assets such as 
livestock etc which are listed in Loder’s 1611 balance sheet (Bryer, 2000b, p.372) and in 
any case as Bryer says (2000b, p.373), ‘he fails to account for all his fixed capital’. Again 
following P1, the 10% charge was based on the legal maximum rate of interest then in 
force following the Act of 1571, and the surplus beyond that corresponded to reasonable 
remuneration for Loder’s labour according to medieval scholastic doctrine. As Fussell 
(1936, p.xxiii) suggests, his objective was to make a living from his estate and obtain the 
maximum return from his expenditure of capital and his managerial and manual labour. 
Therefore it does not make sense to quantify the latter two components of the investment 
as a rate of return. Instead, it is sensible to compute it as an amount, in the seventeenth 
century sense as a reward for husbandry (Tribe, 1987, pp.54-59) having deducted the 
charge for capital. Loder was not a merchant but a farmer and was therefore concerned 
with profit in its relation to revenue, as the main emphasis of his accounts show, so that 
his concern was with the gross margin (Freear, 1994). 
 Another example of ROCE used by Bryer was Arthur Young’s illustration of the 
accounts of Mr Ruggles of Clare, in the period 1784-1787. According to Bryer (2000b, 
p.376), this is a ‘single-entry system for calculating the return on capital employed’. 
Again the assertion is difficult to sustain against the evidence. Young (1787, p.238) 
calculates the rate of profit as £205/£646, or 31%. £205 is the average profit over four 
years and £646 is the capital advanced at the beginning of the period in the form of a 
stock valuation and the amount paid to the preceding tenant for labour, rents and taxes.12  
Like Loder, Ruggles (or Young on his behalf) uses residual income, and again the 
calculation has nothing to do with ROCE in the modern sense. Even so, Bryer (2000b, 
p.377) says ‘…that this profit is authentically capitalist is signatured by including in the 
expenses the decrease in value of the capital assets which “are no more” by £398 4s 1d. 
Buried in this charge is the depreciation of the livestock…’ (emphasis added). However, 
the depreciable assets at the beginning of the period were only valued at £289 in total. 
Because the original £646 is the combination of opening stock and an accrued payment 
for work done by the preceding tenant, split £289 and £357 respectively, when like is 
compared with like, the opening and closing stock values for the livestock, deadstock, 
manure tillage etc are £289 and £248 respectively. Only £51 is therefore ‘depreciation’ in 
a loose sense (ie a difference between two stock valuations four years apart) and the 
remainder is a write off of accrued expenses.  
An important omission, from the point of view of Weber and Bryer, is the absence 
of a capital account, since Young makes no attempt to aggregate the assets at the period-
end or reconcile the change in value to the profit figure.13 Meanwhile in a separate 
calculation Young (1788, p.238) believes the annual charge for ‘wear and tear’ is £30 and 
                                                 
12 Curiously, the £205 is arrived at by deducting only three years’ interest, whereas the 
profit after interest, £180, is after deducting four years’ interest. The interest charged 
throughout was 5%, which compares with the official rate of 4.5% and the usury law 
limit of 5% (Pressnell, 1960, p.192). 
 
13 Such a calculation would have involved adding the value of unsold production, £660 
and the £248 for livestock. Young does not provide details of Ruggles’s cash or 
drawings, so the closing capital cannot be ascertained or reconciled to the profit. 
 
presumably this is Bryer’s ‘buried’ charge, but this is unrelated to Ruggles’s cattle as the 
costing is for arable output only. In the absence of accuracy and any clear accounting for 
capital or definition of depreciation or consistent use it is difficult to draw any conclusion 
about the nature of these accounts, capitalist or otherwise. A similar conclusion can be 
drawn about Coton Hall, whose accounts resembled Loder’s and Young’s (Bryer, p.390), 
and which ‘allowed’, or meant that ROCE ‘could’ be calculated  (Bryer, 2006a, pp.383, 
386), whereas the only evidence of farmers actually calculating ROCE is in the late 
nineteenth century (Stamp, 1916, cited Bryer, 2006a, p.393).  
The earliest example of a specific rate of return calculation is the New Mills Cloth 
Manufactory, 1681 (Table 1: Panel B). Although New Mills is cited extensively, Bryer 
(2005) makes no mention of this calculation and does not list the example in his Table 1 
on p.35. Sir James Stansfield computed forecasted profit in order to compare to the legal 
rate of interest (Mepham, 1988, p.60). It is unclear for Mepham (or Scott, 1905, cited in 
Mepham, 1988) whether Stansfield computed the rate of return on the investment or 
compared the forecasted level of profit with what would have been realised from an 
investment of equivalent capital at the legal rate of interest. The use of forecast rates of 
return was common throughout the subsequent century as evidence from textile firms 
such as Richard Coxeter, Paul-Wyatt, and J&N Phillips suggests (Wadsworth and Mann, 
1931; Table 1, panel B). Such an approach, and indeed the use of differential discount 
rates on bills of exchange by Thomas Marsden of Bolton in 1683, is consistent with P1 
and the scholastic doctrine of lucrum cessans, and its reliance on ex ante estimates (there 
is no evidence of the capital employed being computed ex post in any of these cases), and 
is in any case is more consistent with the residual income approach that became 
increasingly common. 
 Such residual income, or more accurately capital charging computations were as 
important as ROCE calculations. Of the seven examples cited by Bryer as using ROCE 
(2005, table 1, p.35), only three (Ashington, British Iron and Robert Morris) were using 
rate of return on assets calculations of any kind, two (Charlton and Mona) used capital 
charging, whilst Boulton and Watt used mark-up on cost 14  and Thomas Hall used 
discounted cash flow (DCF) [Table 1]. Capital charging indicates the treatment of interest 
as a cost for the purpose of planning new ventures, but might equally be used in 
conjunction with partnership profit sharing systems for example at the Knight’s 
Stourbridge partnership the partners credited their accounts with interest on undistributed 
capital (Pollard, 1963, p.80). In this sense, methods of accounting for profit by early 
industrialists are explained by capital socialisation through partnerships (P1).  
 Meanwhile, the New Mills calculations of 1681 are characterised by Bryer (2005, 
pp.56-59) as semi-capitalist, despite the obvious similarity of the method of calculating 
profits to those used elsewhere and subsequently, as detailed in Table 1. Pollard’s (1963, 
1965) extensive surveys suggest few cases of ROCE calculations at this time and his 
evidence is accordingly disputed by Bryer. In particular, Pollard (1965, p.235) finds no 
evidence of ROCE calculations because capital mainly financed fluctuating current assets 
and liabilities. For Bryer (2005, p.40) this is proof that Pollard  
                                                 
14 Specifically, Boulton and Watt include depreciation charges in arriving at cost (thereby 
satisfying Bryer’s condition for a capitalist ROCE calculation) and add the required 
mark-up. 
 
‘does not understand the modern meaning of capital employed…and seems unaware that 
the fluctuating balance of the owners' capital is the residual after profit or loss that, no 
matter how “wildly” it fluctuates, always does so around a positive capital employed, that 
is, the sum of assets. Pollard assumes management is not accountable for all its assets and 
its debts, that is, here he defines capital employed as owner's equity!’  
 
Even if it were true that Pollard does not understand the modern meaning of capital 
employed, it would not necessarily undermine his ability to recognise earlier forms of 
these calculations. Pollard meanwhile notices that loan finance was conflated with 
partners’ capital, attracting interest as a division of profit (Pollard, 1965, p.234) and 
rightly equates owners’ equity with net assets as capital employed. As in earlier times, 
interest rates used to determine the division of partners’ profits corresponded to the usury 
laws, for example the 5% rate used by the firm of Cowpe, Oldnow Siddon and Co. in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Piggot, 1949, p.35). 
Such conflation meant it was entirely likely to expect early partnerships to have 
wildly fluctuating balances on their residual capital accounts. For example Edwards’s 
(1967, pp.255-58) analysis of the accounts of Birley which indicates that in 1796, the 
firm had fixed assets of £160, current assets of £182,764 and partners’ capital of 
c.£78,000 (estimate based on the capital of one of the partners, John Hornby, Edwards, 
1967, p.255). The assets are for the weaving side of the business only, suggesting current 
assets, factoring in the spinning operation, for the total business in excess of £300,000. 
These fluctuations were compounded by ordinary drawings, partners’ salaries and the 
requirement for capital withdrawals on partner retirements.15
                                                 
15 For example the partnership agreement of 1791 establishing the firm of McConnel 
Kennedy (MCK/1/2) 
 
Not only did such features of industrial finance preclude meaningful ROCE 
calculations, but they also extended the influence of the usury laws on profit calculations 
well into the nineteenth century. The legal maximum interest rate of 5% applied 
throughout the period of the industrial revolution. Businesses such as Birley and similar 
cotton concerns with large working capital balances depended on the use of bills of 
exchange for trade finance and demonstrated similar practices to Thomas Marsden over a 
century earlier.16 They could not ignore the 5% rule without risking non-enforceability of 
debts. An important component of profit calculation was the technique of usury law 
evasion that evolved, exemplified by McConnel and Kennedy, Evans and Sons of Derby 
and Strutts. These firms charged higher prices for their output but allowed customers to 
deduct a percentage in return for prompt payment. By setting terms of trade in this 
fashion and allowing discounts differentially by product, returns on book debts for these 
firms could vary between 7.5% at McConnel Kennedy and 20% for Evans candlewicks 
(Shapiro, 1967, pp.66-67). 
 The organisation of productive forces determined the precise nature of profit 
calculations in other cases. The use of DCF calculations at Thomas Hall is illustrative and 
the use of risk adjusted discount rates (in this case 12.5%) was a useful method of 
relating required return to the impact of geological and similar conditions on invested 
assets, analogous to the use of Sea Loan finance in the Renaissance period. Bryer’s 
hypothesis relies on generalisation of the Thomas Hall case: ‘Finally, evidence of present 
value and other rate-of-return on capital calculations abounds in the extractive industry, 
                                                 
16 Although these examples are taken from the cotton industry, the practice of using book 
credit to generate high implicit rates of return was quite general in the early modern 
period (North, 1691, p.7). 
  
for example, by Thomas Hall in the 1830s [Fleischman & Parker, 1997, p. 130]’ (Bryer, 
2005, p.40, emphasis added). Whilst it is true that the extractive industries did use DCF 
calculations in the nineteenth century (Pollard, 1963, p.84, 1965, p.238, Taylor, 1980, 
pp.59-61), because it reflected the underlying risky nature of the managed assets,17 it 
should be noted that Fleischman & Parker, (1997) only cite two examples: Thomas Hall 
and Ashington Colliery, with only the latter cited as using return on capital, and with 
‘shocking’ inaccuracies.18
 At Carron, it is clear that profit on capital was calculated in 1766 (Bryer (2006c), 
but as Carron’s ownership became less socialised, the coherence of the accounts declined 
(Bryer, 2005, p.60). Factional division between the partners prevented them from 
imposing common standards of accountability, so that the managing partner, Joseph 
Stainton was able to enlarge his block shareholding and run the firm for his own benefit 
(Campbell, 1961, pp.170-80). Consistent with Toms (2005), and P1, the evidence shows 
that the consequence of reduced socialisation is actually reduced accountability.  
The above discussion has shown in line with P1 but not P2, that ROCE 
calculations were the exception rather than the rule before 1840. So when did modern 
ROCE calculations emerge? From Marx’s perspective, a capitalist mentality means 
understanding the real source of value but suppressing that knowledge for the purposes of 
conducting business and drawing up accounts. It also means vulgarisation of value theory 
                                                 
17  There is at least as much evidence of DCF calculations in the ‘semi-capitalist’ 
seventeenth century for the purposes of lease valuation (Lewin, 1970). 
  
18  So much so that the capital could not be ascertained on the subsequent dissolution of 
the firm and analysing the figures provided (Fleischman and Parker, p.139), it is 
impossible to reconcile the change in profit to the change in sales within any reasonable 
range of assumptions about change in assets or profit margins.   
 
by non-Marxist economists. Therefore if ROCE is used it follows developments in non-
Marxist economics. For example by 1840s classical economics had developed a complete 
and consistent theory of economic rent,19 so we would expect to see charging for capital 
(and residual income accounting), which is consistent with the modern notion of 
economic income and with the evidence. The organisation of production, for example 
with some partners providing labour and therefore drawing salaries, and social relations 
of production, for example partnership accounting also explain the use of capital charging.  
The use of return on investment incorporating all capital invested and associated 
monitoring of returns reflected the integration of previously specialised businesses, for 
example Du Pont’s integration of the Gunpowder Trade Association after 1903. 
Integration of production, sales and purchasing provided the basis of the analytical 
system of measuring return of investment developed by Dupont after 1914 (Previts and 
Merino, 1998, Johnson and Kaplan, 1987, p.66-88). At Hawthorn Leslie on Tyneside, 
similar ROCE calculations were performed by reference to the three departments in the 
period 1896-1902, although the capital allocations suggested by the firm’s auditors were 
arbitrary and the resulting figures treated with some credulity by the management 
(McLean, 2006). ROCE along these lines also reflects entity theory, which argues the 
objective of business is to increase the wealth of all sources of financing and which was 
not recognised until 1922 (Paton, 1922). In parallel investors began to use profit rates on 
equity instead of dividend yields to value shares, although the development was delayed 
by the Wall Street crash, and in Britain investors continued their nineteenth century 
                                                 
19 The theories of differential rent explained by Ricardo and of absolute rent by Marx 
(Fine, 1991). 
 
fixation with dividend yield for much longer (Rutterford, 2003, pp.136-8). Such 
approaches influenced the perception and calculation of ROCE. When The Economist 
used the term ROCE when reporting cotton company results, its method was to take the 
simple average of dividend yield and bond coupon rate.20 There were two reasons why 
they used this method. First, because firms tended to distribute rather than accumulate 
profits (Toms, 2001), and second because the taxation system did not allow an accurate 
imputation of pre-tax and pre-interest profits (Seligman, 1914).  
In stark contrast to this late development interpretation, for Bryer, the triumph of 
the bourgeoisie in the mid-seventeenth century is nothing less than the victory of the rate-
of-return mentality (Bryer, 2000a). Although the evidence reviewed above casts doubt on 
such a view, the transition from feudalism to capitalism is explained thus (Bryer, 2005, 
p.30):  
Harnessing the merchant’s rate-of-return mentality to the farmer’s mentality of exploiting 
labour in production gave us the capitalist mentality of pursuing the rate-of-return on 
capital employed.  It was revolutionary because it drove farmers, and then landlords, 
manufacturing entrepreneurs and ultimately managers, to constantly ‘improve’ 
production; to continuously increase the intensity and productivity of labour to earn an 
excess return on capital (emphasis added). 
 
Whereas it may be true that landlords, manufacturing entrepreneurs and ultimately 
managers were concerned to earn excess return on capital, there is no evidence in this 
case that it comes from a capitalist mentality of pursuing ROCE, since there are few 
examples of such calculations being performed. An excess return on capital implies a rate 
above some required rate, which for Bryer, originates in the 1690s. First citing Marx, 
Bryer (2005, p.30) argues: 
                                                 
20 For example, The Economist, 22nd February, 1895, pp.26-27. 
 
in a word, it [the National Debt] has given rise to stock-exchange gambling and the 
modern bankocracy…whose full development dates from the founding of the Bank of 
England in 1694” (Marx, 1976b, pp.919-920).  In these markets for social capital, the 
required return on capital appears and becomes related to market prices.  
(Emphasis added). 
 
For such an outcome to be possible, it would be necessary for fictitious stock market 
capital to be realisable through the expansion of the credit system, or in other words the 
unity of commercial and bank capital through the medium of the stock market. Such 
unity, as Marx suggests, was embryonic in 1694, and pushed backwards by restrictions of 
market development following the bubble collapse of 1721 (Neal, 2000). The inclusion of 
industrial activities in required rate of return calculations required the further unity of 
industrial capital with bank and commercial capital, in effect the creation of finance 
capital (Hilferding, 1981). Indeed the rise of finance capital in the early 20th century 
coincides with the origins of modern ROCE calculations in the review of evidence above.  
Meanwhile, industrial capitalists are responsible for the real subsumption of 
labour, and, as Bryer, 2005, p.35 suggests:  
 
‘relative surplus value - the ratio of surplus value to wages - underlies the accounting 
rate-of-return on capital employed… [So] … the tell-tale signature of real subsumption is 
accountability for the rate-of-return on capital employed.  Present value calculations ex 
ante and rate-of-return or residual income calculations ex post provide evidence that 
management is accountable for the rate-of-return on capital employed (Bryer, 2004b)’.   
 
If this were the case, it would be expected that profit calculations would follow the 
method suggested by Marx, to include the relation between surplus value (s) and variable 
capital (v), relative surplus value as a component of the rate of profit s/C (where C = 
capital advanced). However variable capital expenditure, or labour cost, is neither a 
necessary condition for such calculations nor reflected empirically in any actual rate of 
return calculations performed. Some residual income calculations resemble ‘return on 
capital advanced’ through their use of opening book value (Peasnell, 1982, Ohlson, 1994), 
but again, these are not typically found in the accounting notebooks of industrial 
capitalists.21 On the other hand where management is accountable for ROCE, it does not 
follow that they are at the same time managing the process of the real subsumption of 
labour. Indeed such calculations could be performed for a variety of other useful purposes, 
such as the reduction of a principal’s monitoring costs. Therefore, whereas in all 
probability the real subsumption of labour and accounting for the ROCE co-exist, using 
ROCE to infer real subsumption is insufficient.  
In summary, the evidence suggests that the usury laws had a lasting impact on 
calculative mentality, which in combination with decentralised production, restricted the 
extent and disclosure of return on capital calculations in general before 1840 and ROCE 
calculations in particular prior to 1914. There is accordingly value in attempting to 
explain the British Industrial Revolution in terms of calculative mentality, but not in 
terms of the adoption of ROCE calculations alone. The evidence therefore tends to 
support P1 and not P2. 
 
IV 
Bryer suggests that (2005, p.27) ‘the capitalist mentality drove revolutions in the 
technical and social relations of production in key sectors of the economy’. Instead it can 
                                                 
21 In all the examples of residual income accounting cited by Bryer (2005), the evidence 
amounts to a charge on capital, which might be expected in partnership accounting, 
without reference to whether the charge is on opening capital or how the cost of capital 
was derived. 
 
be argued that the capitalist mentality arises from revolutions in the organisation of the 
forces of production, or the material base, which themselves ultimately arise from the 
physical and mental activities of the inventors. The physical and mental labour process of 
others is then subsumed in the economic base and capital is valorised as abstract labour in 
the superstructure. Following accumulation and capital socialisation the investing 
capitalist is confronted with abstract labour as accumulated capital. Accounting is 
therefore concerned directly with money capital circuits and the distribution of money 
capital and only very indirectly with subsumed labour. In other words accounting is the 
administration of the social relations of production. 
Bryer’s notion of calculative mentality and accounting signature has taken the 
Sombart-Weber debate into a new dimension. Instead of associating capitalism with the 
existence of basic accounting techniques, the concern becomes instead the rationale 
behind accounting calculation, and therefore with the mentality of economic decision-
makers. Mapping these calculations is a new and important part of the research agenda.  
Whilst accepting Bryer’s broad view, his narrow view has been challenged and 
needs revising in three areas. The first is that Bryer uses the capitalist mentality to predict 
behaviour in all forms of capitalism with only partial reference to the organisation of 
productive forces, leading to over-reliance on ROCE as the accounting signature of 
interest to the accounting historian. Therefore a second challenge to Bryer is that  
evidence on the employment of ROCE calculations, shows that most early modern and 
industrial revolution entrepreneurs did not make use of such calculations, and their partial 
use and later adoption reflected the both the organisation of production and social 
ownership of capital. There is evidence to suggest that the methods of calculating and 
dividing profit emerged in tandem with institutions that governed the accumulation and 
distribution of profit, particularly the mechanisms for interest rate regulation. Early or 
transitional capitalism contains only partial aspects of the calculations necessary for the 
computation of ROCE, which is why there are only limited and partial examples before 
1900. The slow retreat of feudalism and its replacement with personal (as opposed to 
corporate) capitalism slowed the adoption of modern accounting calculations in Britain. 
Modern capitalism as a mentality required the demise first of usury in the courts and 
associated restrictions on risk free returns, and then of the labour theory of value in the 
realm of political economy. Only then could the doctrine of capital as a sui generis factor 
of production emerge and demand its own return, independent of rent and wages, as 
profit, and only then was the computation and analysis of profit and profitability made 
possible. 
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Table 1: Profitability analysis in the agricultural and industrial revolutions 
 
 Date Industry Method used according to 
Bryer/ Commentary 
Sources 
Panel A) 
Examples cited by  
Bryer  
    
Robert Loder of 
Romney Marsh 
1611 Agriculture Residual Income  
 
Notional interest charged on 
capital invested in crops  
Bryer 2005, 
p.39 
 
Freer, 1970, 
p.28. 
Robert Morris’s 
copper smelting 
partnership 
1726 Metal Return on capital  
Forecast profit on advanced as 
fixed capital plus stock  
Bryer, 2005, 
table 1 
 
Jones, 1985, 
p.20 
Coton Hall 1744 Agriculture Return on capital  
Change in cash plus difference 
between opening and closing 
capital values 
Bryer 2006a, 
p.283 
Carron 1766 Metals Return on capital  
10% Interest on capital stock 
Bryer, 2006c 
Bryer, 2006c 
Mr Ruggles (Arthur 
Young's example) 
1788 Agriculture Return on capital  
 
Notional interest charged on 
capital advanced as stock and 
expenses 
Bryer 2000b, 
p.376 
 
Young, 1788, 
pp.235-244 
Mona Mine 1793-
1800 
Coal Return on capital  
10% charge on capital 
Bryer, 2005, 
table 1 
Boyns and 
Edwards, 1997, 
p.52 
Boulton and Watt 1801 Hardware Return on capital  
40% mark-up on cost 
Bryer, 2005, 
table 1 
Roll, 1930, 
p.248 
Charlton Mills 1810 Textiles Return on capital  
5% charge on capital 
Bryer, 2005, 
table 1 
Stone, 1973, 
p.77. 
British Iron Co.  1826 Metal Return on capital  
Forecasted rate from 
promoters’ cost estimates 
Bryer, 2005, 
table 1 
Jones, 1985, 
p.216 
Thomas Hall 1834- Coal Return on capital  Bryer, 2005, 
1835 Forecast revenues discounted 
at risk 12.5% 
table 1 
Fleischman and 
Parker, 1977, 
p.130. 
Ashington Colliery 1843 Coal Return on capital  
Return on partners’ capital  
Bryer, 2005, 
table 1 
Fleischman and 
Parker, 1977, 
p.139. 
     
Panel B) Other 
examples 
    
New Mills Cloth 
Manufactory 
1681 Textiles Forecast profit rate c/f interest 
rate 
Mepham, 1988, 
p.62 
Thomas Marsden 
of Bolton 
McConnel 
Kennedy, Evans, 
Strutts 
1683 
 
1800-
1830 
Textiles 
 
Textiles 
Bills discounted differentially, 
4-5% 
 
Bills discounted differentially, 
7.5-20% 
Wadsworth and 
Mann, 1931, 
p.94. 
Shapiro, 1967, 
pp.66-7. 
Richard Coxeter 1720 Textiles Bubble scheme for Indian 
calico plantation, promised 4-
5% fixed returns 
Wadsworth and 
Mann, 1931, 
p.120 
Paul-Wyatt 1744 Textiles Forecast rate of profit on 
capital = 20% on fixed capital, 
15% on circulating capital 
Wadsworth and 
Mann, 1931, 
p.439 
J & N Philips and 
Co 
1765 Textiles Forecast rate of profit on 
capital = 5% 
Wadsworth and 
Mann, p.291 
Northumberland 
mines generally 
1818 Coal Revenue capitalising using risk 
adjusted interest rate 
Pollard, 1965 
p.238. 
 
 
 
